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Abstract
Abductive reasoning assigns special status to the explanatory
power of a hypothesis. But how do people make explana-
tory judgments? Our study clarifies this issue by asking: (i)
How does the explanatory power of a hypothesis cohere with
other cognitive factors? (ii) How does probabilistic informa-
tion affect explanatory judgments? In order to answer these
questions, we conducted an experiment with 671 participants.
Their task was to make judgments about a potentially explana-
tory hypothesis and its cognitive virtues. In the responses, we
isolated three constructs: Explanatory Value, Rational Accept-
ability, and Entailment. Explanatory judgments strongly co-
hered with judgments of causal relevance and with a sense of
understanding. Furthermore, we found that Explanatory Value
was sensitive to manipulations of statistical relevance relations
between hypothesis and evidence, but not to explicit infor-
mation about the prior probability of the hypothesis. These
results indicate that probabilistic information about statistical
relevance is a strong determinant of Explanatory Value. More
generally, our study suggests that abductive and probabilistic
reasoning are two distinct modes of inference.
Keywords: Human Reasoning; Abduction; Explanatory Judg-
ment; Explanatory Value; Probability.
Introduction
Explanatory judgments are central to abductive reasoning,
that is: inferring to the available hypothesis that can best ex-
plain the evidence. Understanding what determines the ex-
planatory power of a hypothesis is of crucial importance for
researchers in different fields: for cognitive psychologists,
who study the principles of human reasoning (e.g., Oaksford
& Chater 2000); AI researchers, who use abduction for belief
revision, knowledge representation and fault diagnosis (e.g.,
Paul 2000); for philosophers of science and epistemologists,
who investigate the rationality of abductive inferences, and
their relation to probabilistic inference (Lipton 2004; Douven
2011).
Expanding on a growing body of literature in the philos-
ophy and cognitive psychology of explanation, we investi-
gated (i) how explanatory power relates to other features of
a hypothesis with respect to an explanandum, such the hy-
pothesis’ degree of confirmation, its causal relevance, logical
relations, and the sense of understanding it provides; and (ii)
how probabilistic information affects explanatory judgment.
Regarding the first question, empirical research in cogni-
tive and developmental psychology has shown that expla-
nation plays several intertwined roles in human cognition
(Lombrozo 2011). Explanatory relationships, particularly
causal relationships, guide categorization (Carey 1985, 201
ff; Lombrozo 2009), support inductive inference and learn-
ing (Holyoak & Cheng 2011; Legare & Lombrozo 2014),
and calibrate metacognitive strategies involved in problem-
solving (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher 1994).
Explanatory considerations can also contribute to the cred-
ibility of a hypothesis. Koehler (1991) reviewed much of the
work on how explanation influences subjective probabilities,
and argued that merely focusing on a hypothesis as if it were
the true explanation of observed data is sufficient to boost the
subjective probability assigned to that hypothesis. Explana-
tion has also been demonstrated to influence how probabil-
ities are assigned to one proposition in the light of another.
Sloman (1994) found that a proposition boosted the probabil-
ity assigned to another proposition if they shared an explana-
tion.
In particular, cognitive virtues such as the simplicity (Lom-
brozo 2007; Bonawitz & Lombrozo 2012) and generalizabil-
ity (Preston & Epley 2005) of a potentially explanatory hy-
pothesis have been shown to be plausible determinants of
explanatory judgment. For example, Bonawitz & Lombrozo
(2012) and Lombrozo (2007) quantified the simplicity of an
explanation in terms of the number of causes it cites, and
provided pre-school and adult participants with information
about the base rate of each cause. They found that both chil-
dren and adults relied on the simplicity of a hypothesis as a
cue commensurate to base rate information in the face of un-
certainty. These results indicate that explanatory judgment is
a function of both simplicity and probabilistic information.
While simplicity, and generalizability may be two determi-
nants of explanation, the sense of understanding bestowed by
a hypothesis seems to be a robust outcome of good explana-
tions. Rozenblit & Keil (2002), for example, considered the
phenomenon of the illusion of explanatory depth, whereby
people believe they understand the world in greater detail,
coherence, and depth than they actually do. A sense of under-
standing was found to be significantly stronger for explana-
tory knowledge relative to other knowledge domains. Along
similar lines, the connection between inference and explana-
tory understanding has been criticized by Trout (2002), who
argues that a sense of understanding is frequently deceptive,
produced by overconfidence and hindsight bias, and in any
case not a good indicator for an actually valuable explana-
tion.
In this body of literature in cognitive psychology, ex-
planations are typically presented as causal explanations.
This choice coheres with philosophical literature on expla-
nation that stresses that good explanations have to provide
information about the causes that bring about the explanan-
dum phenomenon (e.g., Salmon 1971/1984; Woodward 2003;
Strevens 2008). However, other philosophical models, such
as the covering-law model of explanation, focus on the log-
ical relations between explanans and explanandum, such as
logical implication (Hempel 1965). In order to have a better
understanding of what determines explanatory judgments, it
is therefore natural to compare them to judgments of causal-
ity, logical implication, and probability.
Regarding our second question about the relationship be-
tween probability and explanation, much of the attention
has concentrated on the relationship between abductive and
Bayesian inference. For example, van Fraassen (1989) argued
that abductive and probabilistic inference are incompatible.
If we believe more strongly in good explanations than war-
ranted by their posterior probability, we will violate Bayes’
rule and be subject to probabilistic incoherence. However,
if abductive inferences have to agree with probabilistic infer-
ences as governed by the axioms of probability and by Bayes’
Theorem, it is unclear whether they have independent sig-
nificance, or whether they are just redundant with respect to
probabilistic inference.
To address van Fraassen’s challenge, many authors have
maintained that explanatory judgments guide probabilistic in-
ference, or act as a heuristics for them. For instance, Lipton
(2004) argued that explanatory judgments may give a good
descriptive account of our inferential practices, or help to de-
termine the ingredients of probabilistic inferences (e.g., Hen-
derson 2014). Other authors have turned their attention to ex-
plicating explanatory power in probabilistic terms (McGrew
2003; Schupbach & Sprenger 2011; Crupi & Tentori 2012),
which could help to better explore whether and how abductive
reasoning can be embedded into an overarching probabilistic
framework.
Notably, a substantial part of the aforementioned stud-
ies and recent literature in the psychology of explanation
(Keil & Wilson 2000; Lombrozo 2011, 2012) has been con-
cerned with the question of how explanatory power deter-
mines probability judgments. Instead, the reverse question
has not gained as much attention. With our study, we hope to
advance understanding of how probabilistic information de-
termines explanatory judgments.
We constructed vignettes where participants were given
information about the priors and likelihoods of a potential
explanation, and were asked to make judgments on its ex-
planatory power, posterior probability, and acceptability, as
well as on its logical and causal relation to the explanandum.
After eliciting these judgments, we used a principal compo-
nent analysis to examine how they cluster together. We found
that a small set of constructs, which we dubbed Explanatory
Value, Rational Acceptability, and Entailment, accounted for
most of the variation in the participants’ judgments, and that
explicit information about statistical relevance relations, but
not about base rates, determined judgments of the Explana-
tory Value of a hypothesis. This result suggests that abduc-
tive and probabilistic reasoning are distinct modes of infer-
ence, and that abduction is often probabilistically incoherent.
In what follows, we first describe the methods we used in
the experiment designed to collect our data. We then summa-
rize our findings and put them into a broader perspective.
Experiment
Methods
Participants 744 students at Tilburg University (The
Netherlands) participated in our study, and 671 completed it
(383 male, Mage = 21.5 (SD = 2.3)). They were randomly
assigned to one version of an experimental vignette. Partic-
ipants were all proficient English speakers, and participated
on a voluntary basis, either for free or in exchange for course
credit.
Design and Material We employed three distinct types of
vignettes with the same logical structure, but different con-
tent. Participants were presented with one version of a vi-
gnette, where two possible events were related to two possi-
ble explanations for that event.
Vignette 1: There are two urns on the table. Urn A con-
tains 67% white and 33% black balls, Urn B contains
only white balls. One of these urns is selected. You don’t
know which urn is selected, but you know that the chance
that Urn A is selected is 25%, and that the chance that
Urn B is selected is 75%. From the selected urn a white
ball is taken at random.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Urn A has been
chosen.
Vignette 2 and 3 had more concerete content, closer to
cases of ordinary reasoning.
Vignette 2: Again and again, Ruud has knee problems
when playing football. The doctors give him two op-
tions: knee surgery or a conservative treatment. If Ruud
chooses to go into surgery, he cannot play football for
half a year; if he chooses the conservative treatment,
there is a 33% chance that he can play again after one
month; otherwise (with a chance of 67%) he has to rest
longer. You don’t know which option Ruud chooses, but
you believe that the chance that he chooses surgery is
75%—and that the chance that he chooses the conser-
vative treatment is 25%. A month later a joint friend
tells you that Ruud is still unable to play football.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Ruud has cho-
sen for the conservative treatment.
Vignette 3: Louise arrives by train in Twin City. Twin
city has two districts: West Bank and East Bank. In West
Bank, there is only one taxi company, namely Green Taxi
Ltd., and all their cabs are green. Green Taxi Ltd. also
owns 67% of all cabs in East Bank. The other cabs in
East Bank are owned by The Red Taxi Inc., all their cabs
are red. Louise does not know which part of the city the
train is entering, but judging from her knowledge of Twin
City she assumes that there is a 75% chance that she is
in West Bank (and a chance of 25% that she is in East
Bank). At some point, Louise sees a green cab from the
train.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Louise is in East
Bank.
After reading the vignette, participants assessed seven
items (the construct names in italics were not provided to the
participants) on a Likert scale ranking from 1 (“do not agree
at all”) to 7 (“fully agree”). For Vignette 1, the seven items
read as follows:
Logical Implication The hypothesis logically implies that a
white ball has been taken out.
Causal Relevance The hypothesis specifies the cause that a
white ball has been taken out.
Confirmation The hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that a
white ball has been taken out.
Posterior Probability The hypothesis is probable given that
a white ball has been taken out.
Explanatory Power The hypothesis explains that a white ball
has been taken out.
Understanding The hypothesis provides understanding why
a white ball has been taken out.
Truth The hypothesis is true.
The distinction between explanatory power and explanatory
value just serves to keep apart the name of a response variable
and a broader cognitive factor associated with a hypothesis.
After filling in this questionnaire, the participants could
provide information about the way they made their judg-
ments, and we collected some demographic data.
Vignettes were, in a between-subjects design, varied in two
dimensions, corresponding to two independent variables:
IV 1: Statistical Relevance The degree of statistical rele-
vance between the explanans and the explanandum, with
the four values “strong/weak disconfirm” and “strong/weak
confirm”.
IV 2: Prior Probability The prior probability of the hypoth-
esis under consideration (.25, .5, or .75).
For all three types of vignettes, all possible 4×3 = 12 com-
binations of the values of these variables were realized in the
experiment. For example, in the case of Vignette 1, Statisti-
cal relevance was manipulated by changing the color of the
ball drawn from the urn and/or by changing the explanatory
hypothesis (from Urn A to Urn B), leading to four different
conditions ordered according to the degree of confirmation
they provide.
Procedure Participants completed the questionnaire on a
university PC or their own computer in the digital environ-
ment of LimeSurvey installed on a local server. The use of
LimeSurvey guaranteed that the data could be protected and
provided with a time stamp, and information about the IP ad-
dress of the respondent. The experiment was self-paced, and
took on average approximately 10 minutes to complete.
Results
Prior to the analysis of the effects of vignette manipulation,
we explored the interdependencies of the seven items in the
response questionnaire. To recall, the participants were asked
to judge several features of the hypothesis with respect to
the evidence: logical implication, causal relevance, explana-
tory power, increase in understanding, confirmation, poste-
rior probability and truth. By analyzing the interdependen-
cies with the help of the Pearson zero-order correlation coef-
ficient, we determined whether some of these seven concepts
tap on the same dimension and could be identified with each
other.
Table 1: Zero-order correlations for 7 items (N = 671), all
correlations with p < .01.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Log. Implication - .38 .22 .32 .46 .30 .12
2. Causality - .45 .39 .56 .63 .37
3. Confirmation - .56 .35 .47 .63
4. Post Probability - .37 .51 .46
5. Explan. Power - .60 .28
6. Understanding - .36
7. Truth -
The correlations are presented in Table 1. The analysis re-
vealed that all of the variables correlated at least with .3 with
several other variables, but at most .63. These medium-sized
correlations show that the participants did not conflate cog-
nate concepts (e.g., causal relevance and explanatory power)
with each other, which would be reflected in correlation co-
efficients greater than .7. At the same time, the response
variables were sufficiently related to each other to motivate
a Principal Component Analysis: that is, a decomposition
of the seven response variables into constructs that could ac-
count for most of the variation in the data.
Principal Component Analysis The factorability of the 7
items was examined with a Principle Component Analysis
(PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy was .82 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signif-
icant (χ2(21) = 1790.77, p < .0001). The initial eigenvalues
showed 51% of variance explained by the first factor, 16%
explained by the second factor, and 10% explained by the
third factor. A visual inspection of the scree plot revealed a
’leveling off’ of eigenvalues after the three factors, therefore,
a three factor solution using the oblique rotation was con-
ducted, with the three factors explaining 77% of the variance.
All items had primary loadings over .7 Table 2 presents the
factor loading matrix (loadings under .30 suppressed). In the
remainder, we restrict our analysis to these three factors.
Table 2: Factor loadings and communalities based on a prin-
ciple component analysis with oblimin rotation for 7 items (N
= 671).
1 2 3 Communality
Log. Implication .94 .94
Causality .86 .74
Confirmation -.84 .77
Post Probability -.72 .67
Explan. Power .81 .73
Understanding .87 .78
Truth -.88 .75
The names for these factors were derived from the cluster-
ing shown in Table 2. Factor 1, Explanatory Value, clus-
tered explanatory power together with related features of a
hypothesis, such as causality and enhancement of understand-
ing (Dieks & DeRegt, 2005; Strevens 2008). Factor 2, Ratio-
nal Acceptability, captured those features that hang together
with the acceptability of a hypothesis: probability, confirma-
tion, and truth. The strong correlations between these features
were not surprising: confirmation raises posterior probability,
which is in turn an indicator of the truth of a theory. Finally,
Factor 3 captured the strength of the logical relation between
hypothesis and evidence. Since no other response variable
was loaded on this factor, it figured as Entailment, showing
the link to the response variable Logical Implication.1
Tests of Experimental Manipulation We conducted two
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the effects of the in-
dependent variables, Statistical Relevance and Prior Probabil-
ity, on Explanatory Value, Rational Acceptability, and Entail-
1The internal consistency for two of the three scales (the third
scale only consisted of one item) was examined using Cronbach’s
alpha, resulting in alpha .82 for Factor 1 and .79 for Factor 2. Com-
posite scores were calculated for each of the three factors using the
mean of the items with primary loadings on each factor. The de-
scriptive values for the newly constructed scales were M = 3.65, SD
= 1.91 for Explanatory Value, M = 3.63, SD = 1.87 for Rational
Acceptability, and M = 3.75, SD = 2.40 for Logical Implication.
ment, respectively.2
Table 3: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Explanatory Value
by Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability (N = 671). SD =
Strong Disconfirm, WD = Weak Disconfirm, WC = Weak Confirm,
SC = Strong Confirm.
Explanatory Value
Statistical Relevance
Prior SD WD WC SC
Low 2.02 (.22) 3.02 (.21) 4.72 (.20) 4.81 (.19)
Medium 1.95 (.21) 3.05 (.20) 4.66 (.21) 4.58 (.20)
High 1.88 (.24) 3.12 (.21) 4.63 (.22) 4.64 (.20)
First, we tested the effects of the experimental manipula-
tion on Explanatory Value. There was a significant main ef-
fect of Statistical Relevance, F(3,659) = 118.53, p < .001,
η2 p = .35, but no effect of Prior Probability, F(2,659) =
0.20, p = .822. There was no interaction effect between Sta-
tistical Relevance and Prior Probability, F(6,659) = 0.12, p
= .994—see Table 3 for the descriptives. A pair-wise com-
parison with Bonferroni correction of the levels of Statistical
Relevance showed a significant difference between all levels
(p < .001), with the exception of Weak and Strong Confirm.
Table 4: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Rational Accept-
ability by Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability (N = 671).
Abbreviations like in Table 3.
Rational Acceptability
Statistical Relevance
Prior SD WD WC SC
Low 1.93 (.18) 2.93 (.18) 3.45 (.17) 5.39 (.16)
Medium 2.05 (.18) 3.10 (.17) 3.74 (.18) 5.62 (.17)
High 1.95 (.20) 3.20 (.18) 3.48 (.18) 5.82 (.17)
Second, we examined the effects of the experimental ma-
nipulation on Rational Acceptability. There was again a
significant main effect of Statistical Relevance, F(3,659) =
223.76, p < .001, η2 p = .51, but no effect of Prior Prob-
ability, F(2,659) = 1.68, p = .188. There was no interac-
tion effect between Statistical Relevance and Prior Probabil-
ity, F(6,659) = 0.81, p = .463—see Table 4 for the descrip-
tives. A pair-wise comparison with Bonferroni correction of
the levels of Statistical Relevance showed a significant dif-
ference between all levels (p < .001), with the exception of
Weak Disconfirmation and Weak Confirmation (p= .005).
2A prior analysis of the effect of the vignette on the three de-
pendent variables revealed that Explanatory Value (but not Rational
Acceptability and Entailment) was also affected by the vignette ma-
nipulation. For clarity of exposition, the statistics is not included
here because the size and direction of the significant main effects
and the interaction effect remained the same when vignette was in-
cluded as a factor.
Table 5: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Entailment by
Statistical Relevance and Prior Probability (N = 671). Abbreviations
like in Table 3.
Entailment
Statistical Relevance
Prior SD WD WC SC
Low 2.37 (.27) 2.98 (.26) 5.92 (.26) 4.14 (.25)
Medium 2.33 (.26) 3.00 (.26) 5.93 (.26) 3.69 (.26)
High 1.88 (.30) 3.09 (.27) 5.92 (.27) 3.32 (.26)
Finally, we analyzed the effects of the experimental ma-
nipulation on Entailment. Similarly to the previous two de-
pendent variables, there was again a significant main effect
of Statistical Relevance, F(3,659) = 105.40, p < .001, η2 p =
.32, but no effect of Prior Probability, F(2,659) = 1.23, p
= .292. There was no interaction effect between Statisti-
cal Relevance and Prior Probability, F(6,659) = 0.76, p =
.598—see Table 5 for the descriptives. A pair-wise compari-
son with Bonferroni correction of the levels of Statistical Rel-
evance showed a significant difference between all degrees (p
< .001) with the exception of Weak Confirm and Weak Dis-
confirm (p= .007). Since Entailment measures the impact of
the hypothesis on the explanandum rather than vice versa, it
is logical that the order deviates from the previous two tables,
with Weak Confirm obtaining the highest score.
Discussion
Our study investigated the coherence of judgments of ex-
planatory power with other cognitive factors that affect the
evaluation of a hypothesis in token explanations of singular
events. With the help of a principal component analysis of
participants’ responses, we identified several constructs un-
der which the response variables could be subsumed. We also
investigated how probabilistic information affected these con-
structs, and Explanatory Value (the most salient construct) in
particular. We observed a neat distinction between judgments
of Explanatory Value and posterior probability. More gener-
ally, participants’ judgments on the seven response variables
(i.e., Logical Implication, Causality, Explanatory Value, Un-
derstanding, Posterior Probability, Confirmation, and Truth)
were aligned along three dimensions: Explanatory Value
(loaded with the response variables Causality, Explanatory
Power, and Understanding), Rational Acceptability (Posterior
Probability, Confirmation and Truth) and Entailment (Logi-
cal Implication). Participants’ judgments on these three fac-
tors were strongly affected by changes in statistical relevance,
specifically by manipulations of the likelihood of the target
hypothesis. Instead, the prior probabilities of the candidate
explanatory hypothesis, presented as objective base rates, af-
fected participants’ judgments in none of those three dimen-
sions. These results suggest a number of conclusions, and
further questions for research.
First of all, explanatory value is a distinct feature of a hy-
pothesis that relates to several other processes such as deduc-
tive and inductive reasoning, causal reasoning, and reasoning
about truth (Lombrozo 2012). Isolating “causality”, “under-
standing” and “explanatory power” (→ Explanatory Value)
from “confirmation”, “posterior probability” and “truth” (→
Rational Acceptability), our principal component analysis co-
heres with previous results about the tight connections be-
tween explanatory power, causality, and a sense of under-
standing (Lipton 2004; Keil 2006 Lombrozo 2007; Trout
2002). It also suggests that reasoners distinguish between the
concepts of Explanatory Value, Rational Acceptability, and
Logical Entailment. However, the number of components be-
hind Explanatory Value is obviously limited by the number
of our dependent variables. One question for future research
is whether Explanatory Value presents the same components
when other dependent variables are added, or when vignettes
with different content or structure are evaluated.
Our results bear on the relationship between abduction and
probabilistic inference in at least two ways. On the one hand,
they show that the rational acceptability of a hypothesis does
not always track its explanatory value. This indicates that
abduction cannot simply be reduced to Bayesian inference,
at least not from a descriptive point of view. On the other
hand, Explanatory Value is strongly determined by explicit,
numeric information about likelihoods. This finding is con-
sistent with the well-documented phenomenon of base rate
neglect (Tversky& Kahneman 1982). It also indicates that in
situations where causal detail is kept sparse and the explanan-
dum corresponds to a singular token event, abductive and
probabilistically reasoning may pull into different directions:
the former is insensitive to information about base rates. This
conclusion presents a challenge for those who want to de-
fend the rationality of abductive inference as a way of com-
ing closer to the truth. However, when base rates are pre-
sented in a different format, reasoners often take them into ac-
count (Gigerenzer& Hoffrage 1995), and it remains an open
question whether in those circumstances, explanatory infer-
ence can be fully described in probabilistic terms. To explore
this possibility, further empirical research is needed about the
determinants of explanatory value across a broader range of
situations, as well as further theoretical explications of ex-
planatory power (Schupbach 2011; Pacer, Lombrozo, Grif-
fiths, Williams, & Chen 2013). We believe that this exchange
between normative theorizing about the nature of explanation
and empirical evidence about the psychology of explanatory
judgment is the key to our understanding of explanatory judg-
ments and abductive reasoning (Colombo 2016).
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